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Abstract

Prior research shows that underreporting chargeable time has been a concern for
public accounting firms even though many of these firms have policies and procedures
that prohibit "eating" time. The purpose of this study is to examine the current state
of this problem and to provide recommendations to manage the problem more effectively. Practicing public accountants at all professional levels were surveyed to determine the extent, opportunity, ethical perception and perceived benefits of underreporting time. The results show that although the majority of the respondents believe
underreporting time is unethical, the majority of them did not report all of their
chargeable hours in the prior year. The main reasons for such behavior stem from
the desire to: (1) receive better periodic performance evaluations, (2) be viewed as
competent by superiors and (3) receive promotions.

Introduction

ublic accounting firms use time budgets
and chargeable hours to make decisions
regarding client billings, future budgets,
personnel evaluations and scheduling. Underreporting chargeable time can negatively impact
such decisions. The policies and procedures
manuals of many accounting firms indicate that
underreporting time or "eating time" is an unacceptable practice. For example, the following
excerpt is from The Way We Do Business. Our
Code of Conduct (pp. 41-42) published by Coopers & Lybrand LLP: Question? Should I ever
"eat" hours? Answer. Pressure to eat time may
be subtle, but even if you feel this pressure, not

P

reporting all your time is inherently dishonest.
Although public accounting firms do not
consider underreporting time an acceptable practice, prior research indicates this issue has been a
problem for management of these firms. The
purpose of this article is to examine the current
state of underreporting chargeable time and to
provide recommendations to mitigate the problem. Practicing accountants were surveyed to
determine the extent to which they underreport
time and to ascertain their beliefs and perceptions regarding the underreporting of chargeable
time. The first section of the paper provides a
brief overview of the limited research on underreporting. Problems of underreporting chargeable time are summarized in section two. The
design and results of the study are discussed in
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is difficult to measure. For example, the type of
engagement (fixed fee versus cost-plus), the
firm's ability to assign accountants to other tasks
for the hours not reported, varying billing rates
and psychological effects (e.g. turnover, morale,
productivity) are factors that affect the economic
magnitude of the problem. While the exact
magnitude of economic loss from underreporting
is impossible to measure, "eating time" definitely affects the profitability of public accounting firms.
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section three. Recommendations to reduce underreporting time are discussed in the fourth
section. The fmal section presents concluding
comments.

Prior Research
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (1977) surveyed local, regional and national public aq.:ounting firms and found that
55 % of the respondents underreported chargeable hours.
Lightner, Adams and Lightner
(1983) surveyed 1500 accountants from three
national CPA firms in six randomly selected cities. Their results show that 67 % of the respon-.
dents had underreported chargeable hours.
Smith, Hutton and Jordan (1996) surveyed 300
accountants from local, regional and national
firms in thirteen different cities and found that
89 % of the respondents did not report all of their
chargeable time. Despite the efforts of the public accounting firms, the results of prior research
show unreported time has been a problem for the
past twenty years.

Study
Design and Demographics

Questionnaires were mailed to a random
sample of 500 members of the Wisconsin Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A total of
224 responses (44%) were received. Demograph
ics of the respondents are shown in Table I:
Table 1
Demographics of Respondents
Position
•
Partners 38 %
Managers
•
Seniors
•
Staff
•
Area
• Audit
• Tax
Other
•
Gender
Female
•
Male
•
Professional Experience
•
Average years

Problems of Underreporting
There are problems for both the CPA
firm and the individual accountant that result
from underreporting time. Problems related to
the firm are highlighted in Coopers and Lybrand's The Way We Do Business. Our Code of
Conduct which lists five specific reasons for reporting all chargeable hours: 1) assists in the
preparation of the budget for the next year; 2)
actual time can be used in negotiating next year's
fees; 3) used by management to make business
and resource decisions; 4) review overall approach to the current engagement and 5) bill client additional fees. Problems related to the individual accountant include poor morale and lower
productivity, which could result in poor evaluations which eventually, will lead to turnover.
Ultimately, the accountant's problems become
the firm's problems.

31 %
24%
7%
45%
40%
15%
33%
67%
13

Results
The Extent of Underreporting

The participants were asked to provide
the percentage of their total chargeable time that

The economic impact of underreporting
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ample, Coopers & Lybrand and several other
firms are communicating to the staff in written
form that "eating" time is not an acceptable.
Two, generation X is not willing to "eat" hours.
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was unrecorded in the preceding year. Table 2
presents the extent of underreporting for all respondents by position. The findings show that
overall 71 % of those responding had underreported chargeable time to some extent during the
previous year. This finding is consistent with
findings (67%) from an earlier study (Lightner et
al. 1983) but inconsistent with the findings
(89%) of a more recent study (Smith et al.
1996). For th?se respondents that underreported
time, the majority of the unrecorded time was
between 1 % and 10 % of the total hours which
is consistent with prior research (Lightner et al.
1983; Smith et al. 1996).

The Ability to Underreport Time Successfully

An accountant's perception as to
whether he or she can successfully underreport
time will probably have an impact on his or her
behavior. Table 3 provides an analysis of the
perception of the participants in our study. The
majority (72 %) of the respondents believes they
can (extremely possible or very possible) under-

. Table 2
Th e E xtent 0fU n d erreportmg Ch argeabl e T"Ime
Percentage of unrecorded chargeable time to
Total
Partner
Manager
total time in the precedinR year
0%
1 to 4
5 to 9
10 to 14
15 to 19
20 and over

29%
25
25
14
1.4
5.6

The findings of this study are consistent
with prior research (Lightner et al. 1982; Smtih
et al. 1996) with one exception. We found that
staff accountants reported the fewest amount of
unrecorded hours while the two prior studies
found that staff accountants reported the highest
amount. We suggest two possible explanations
for this finding. One, the staff accountants'
firms have impressed upon them that underreporting time is an unacceptable activity. For ex-

29.7
25.9
19.9
14.8
1.2
8.5

30.8
22.2
24.9
14.7
1.5

5.9

Senior

Staff

21.8
30.9
29.1
16.4
0
1.8

37.5
25.1
31.2
0
6.2
0

report time successfully. Only I % of the respondents felt that it was not possible to underreport time. Firms' policies are not sufficient to
preclude the underreporting of time.
The Ability to Meet Budget

Another factor likely to influence the
underreporting of time is the accountant's perception of their ability to meet budget by re-

Table 3
A ccount an t'
s percepl10n
0fth·
elr a bTt
I ny t 0 un d erreportfIme success f uIIIy
f
Perceived ability to successPartner
Manager
Senior
Percentage
fully underreport
responding

Staff

Extremely possible
Very possible
Somewhat possible
Slightly possible
Not possible

18.7
43.7
25
6.3
6.3

28.4 %
43.2
17.6
9.5
1.3

29.8
40.5
16.7
10.7
2.4

27.9
48.5
13.2
10.3
0
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0
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firms' literature, such as Coopers & Lybrand's
The Way We Do Business. Our Code of Conduct,
state that underreporting time is unethical, the
accountant's belief as to whether underreporting
is appropriate should affect his or her behavior.
The respondents were asked to report whether
they believed underreporting was ethical. Table
5 provides the responses to this question. While
only 5 % of subjects approved of underreporting,
note there are partners who do approve of underreporting time. In fact 2.4% strongly approve.
Thirty percent of the respondents were indifferent. Nearly two-thirds of respondents disapprove of underreporting which is interesting
since 71 % of the respondents underreported time
in the previous year. These findings indicate the
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porting 100 percent of their chargeable time.
Table 4 shows the participants' responses to this
question. Half of the respondents stated that
they felt they could meet budget very or fairly
often. However, only 12% of the participants
felt they could meet the budget very often. Over
one-third felt they could only meet budget occasionally if they reported all their chargeable
time, and nearly 16% felt they could seldom or
never meet budg~t. This illustrates the relentless
cycle of underreporting time. If a budget is reported as being met even though it actually took
more time, then the future budget will be affected as well, which will perpetuate the problem. This finding also infers that budgets are.
not realistic.

Table 4
Accountants' perception of their ability to meet budget by reporting 100 percent of chargeable time
Perceived ability to meet budget when
all chargeable time is reported
Never
Seldom
Occasionally
Fairly often
Very Often

Percentage
responding
2.3 %
13.5
34.2
37.4
12.6

It is interesting to note that none of the
partners reported that the budget could be met by
reporting all chargeable time, yet, a larger percentage of them, as compared to the other positions, felt the budget could be met very often by
reporting all chargeable hours. None of the staff
felt the budget could be met very often by reporting all of their chargeable time.

accounting

textbooks

Manager

Senior

Staff

0
13.1
28.6
39.3
19

1.5
11.8
39.7
35.3
11.8

5.6
13
37
37
7.4

6.3
25
31.3
37.5
0

ethical perception of underreporting does not
have a big impact on behavior.
Superiors' Influence on Underreporting

One of the biggest potential contributors
to the underreporting of time is the explicit and
implicit requests of the accountant's superior.
Table 6 reports the respondents' responses to the
frequency of requests to underreport time by superiors. The findings show that implicit requests
are more frequent than explicit requests. Almost

Ethical Positions on Underreporting

Although

Partner

and

Table 5
A ccountants perceptIon a b out w heth er un derre [lortmg tIme
Percentage responding
Partner
Manager

Ethical position
Strongly approve
Approve
Indifferent
Disapprove
Strongly disapprove

.9 %
4
29.1
44.8
2l.l

2.4
3.6
21.7
47
25.3
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0
2.9
27.9
41.2
27.9

IS

eth·IC at
Senior
0
5.5
38.2
45.5
10.9

Staff

0
6.3
43.8
50
0
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92 % of the respondents stated that they had
never been explicitly requested to underreport
time while approximately 76 % stated that they
had never received any implicit request to underreport time. Although few accountants are directly told to underreport time, which would
violate many firms' policies, the findings show
there are more implied requests. An argument
can be made that such implicit requests create
more pressur\ for subordinates than explicit requests because the subordinate must decide
whether or not to report all chargeable hours.

Volume 15, Number 1
The results suggest that both seniors and staff
believe underreporting time helps with promotion and advancement. It is interesting to note
that partners, as compared to managers, seniors
and staff, believe underreporting contributes to
personal growth and development, provides a
sense of accomplishment and enhances job satisfaction.
Recommendations to Reduce Underreporting
Although most public accounting firms
have written policies that prohibit "eating" time,
the results of this study show that underreporting
time is still a problem. Four specific recommendations to reduce or deter underreporting
chargeable time include: 1) recognition of the
problem; 2) management leadership; 3) training
and evaluation controls; 4) reevaluation of budgeting process. Management of public accounting
firms needs to admit that underreporting chargeable hours affects the firm's primary asset-the
individual accountant. Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms may not want to admit that underreporting is occurring. During the preliminary stages of this project one of the authors approached a partner of a Big Six firm to see if his
firm would be willing to participate in the study.
He indicated that his firm was reluctant to participate because the distribution of the questionnaire would imply that underreporting was occurring and his firm has policies that prohibits
underreporting chargeable hours. Management
must recognize that underreporting chargeable

Perceived Rewards from Underreponing
Table 7 provides the responses to the
likelihood that underreporting could lead to various rewards. The results show that the three
primary rewards are better periodic evaluation,
superiors' perception of competency and promotion and advancement. Participants also indicated
that the underreporting of time did not contribute
to their personal growth and that it led to job dissatisfaction and negative feelings about themselves.
Table 8 shows the responses, by position, for the probability (very or somewhat
likely) that underreporting will lead to reward.
The findings show that staff personnel believe
underreporting chargeable hours leads to better
periodic performance evaluations, enhances superiors' perception of competency and results in
more interesting and challenging assignments.

Table 6

superiors' request to un derreport time
Type and frequency of request
Explicit requests
Yes, frequently
Yes, infrequently
No, never
Implicit requests
Yes, frequently
Yes, occasionally
No, never

Percentage
respondinR

Partner

Manager

Senior

Staff

.5 %
7.8
91.7

1.3
3.8
94.9

0
10.3
89.7

0
10.9
89.1

0
6.3
93.8

1.4
22.2
76.4

1.3
6.4
92.3

1.5
26.5
72.1

1.9
37
61.1

0
31.3
68.8
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Table 7
Accountants' perceived reward from underreporting chargeable time
L'k
e s 0 Rewa,;d
I el"h
I 00d Th at Und erreportmg Lad]',
Unsure
Somewhat
Perceived Reward
Very likely
Somewhat
likely
unlikely
43.9
9
17.2
Better periodic performance
15.8
evaluation
18.1
Superiors think you are as com14.5
43
10.9
petent or more competent than
others at your level
27.1
Feeling more s~cure about your
8.1
21.7
23.1
job with the firm
Promotion and advancement
10.9
32.6
19
19.9
Assignments to jobs that are more
27.1
24
21.3
6.8
interesting and challenging

Very
unlikely
14

13.6

19.9
17.6
20.8

Feeling of pride in meeting time
budgets for most engagements

6.3

30.2

14.9

22.1

26.6

Feeling that you have contributed
to your personal growth and development
Feeling that you are as competent
as others at your level

2.3

13.1

14.9

34.2

35.6

4.5

18.5

18

32.4

26.6

Feeling that you have accomplished something worthwhile

4.1

14

15.8

34.2

32

Feeling of job satisfaction
Feeling better about yourself as a
person

3.2
2.3

11.3
7.7

17.6
17.1

30.2
28.8

37.8
44.1

time is occurring.

lem. Written policies and procedures will have
little meaning for managers, seniors and staff if
partners do not adhere to such policies.

In addition to written policies and procedures management needs to set the tone that
underreporting will not be tolerated. Since the
results of this study show that partners also underreport time, these individuals will have to alter their own behavior in order to lead by example. The tone set by management will impact the
behavior of the other accountants in the office.
For example, one of the authors, who previously
worked for a Big Six firm, was told by a managing partner that budgeted goals must be met to
get promoted even if that meant eating time.
While the findings of this study do not suggest
that such explicit requests are a problem, the
frequency of implicit requests indicates a prob-

The firms should address this issue in
the initial training of new accountants. The message should be very clear that underreporting
chargeable time will not be tolerated. To illustrate the importance of the issue, firms should
modify the evaluation process (i. e. include a
question about underreporting time in the
evaluation form) and establish clear and severe
penalties for underreporting chargeable hours
(Le. termination, reimbursement to firm for underreported hours).
Modifications to initial
training and the evaluation process will not be
effective unless the partners and managers en-
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force the penalties.

sue that the partners need to address in order to
efficiently use and maintain the most precious
asset (human capital) of the firm. Partners must
first recognize and admit that the problem exists
at all levels before effective policies can be implemented. The partners' need to set the tone and
lead by example. We suggest that firms revise
their initial training, evaluation and budgeting
processes. Severe penalties should be established and enforced. If new policies are not enforced, accountants will continue to underreport
chargeable hours.

Firms also need to reevaluate the budgeting process. The findings of this study show
that half of the respondents felt they could not
meet budget regularly (or very often) by reporting all chargeable hours. Since the budgets do
not appear to be realistic, firms apparently are
using ideal, rather than practical, budgets. If the
budgets that are used for evaluation and planning
purposes are not realistic, firms are creating an
environment that will result in some underreporting of chargeable hours.

Suggestions for Future Research
Conclusions
The limited research on underreporting
time has utilized a survey approach to identify
the levels (positions) that underreport time and
the possible reasons for "eating" time. Such research has not answered two important questions: 1) why does this activity continue to occur? and 2) what type of individual is likely to
underreport time? Future research should utilize
a field study, consisting of interviews with professional at all levels, to determine "why" public
accounting firms allow accountants to continue
to underreport time. We also suggest that future
research should try to identify characteristics that
differentiate the professionals who eat time from
those who report all of their chargeable time.
An understanding of the type of individual that
might "eat" time should help partners and managers to more effectively address this issue. W

Although most public accounting firms
have policies that prohibit underreporting
chargeable hours, the findings of this study show
that accountants at all levels still "eat" time.
While the majority (65.9%) of the respondents
believes underreporting chargeable time is unethical, the majority (71 %) does not report all
chargeable hours. This contradictory behavior
appears to stem from the desire to: 1) receive
better periodic performance evaluations, 2) be
viewed as "competent" by superiors and 3) receive promotion and advancement. The respondents also indicated that underreporting time did
not contribute to their personal growth and that it
led to job dissatisfaction and negative feelings
about themselves.
Three possible explanations as to why
public accounting firms continue to tolerate underreporting chargeable time include: 1) CPA
firms do not believe this is a problem because
policies and procedures prohibit such behavior;
2) competition for clients forces firms to keep
rates low and 3) firms actually benefit because
most fee arrangements are fixed. Underreporting time, however, is a problem that affects both
the individual accountant and the firm. While it
is difficult to measure the impact on either the
individual accountant (i. e. morale, productivity)
or the firm (i.e. inefficiencies, turnover) underreporting chargeable hours is a management is-
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Table 8
Accountants' perceived reward (very or somewhat likely) from underreporting chargeable time.
L'k
e
1 eI'h
1 00 d That Un d erreporting Lads
Perceived Reward
Better periodic performance
evaluation
Superiors think you are as competent or more competent than
others at your level
Feeling more secure about your
job with the firm
Promotion and advancement
Assignments to jobs that are
more interesting and challenging
Feeling of pride in meeting time
budgets for most engagements
Feeling that you have contributed to your personal growth
and development
Feeling that you are as competent as others at your level
Feeling that you have accomJ'lished something worthwhile
Feeling of job satisfaction
Feeling better about yourself as
a person

4.

5.

6.

R ewa~d
All
59.7%

T,0

Panner
44.5

Manager
65.6

Senior
69.1

Staff
81.3

57.5%

43.3

61.2

65.4

87.5

29.8%

24.1

31.4

30.9

50.1

43.5%
33.9%

30.1
33.7

35.8
34.4

65.4
30.9

68.8
43.8

36.5%
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20.0
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